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Abstract 
 
Elsewhere, papers comparing fixed prices with predetermined prices have 
assumed that the frequency of re-setting price contracts is equal in either case. This note 
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Section 1.  Introduction 
 
In standard sticky-price models, firms face menu costs, and therefore set a fixed 
price (FP) for all periods of a price contract. Recent papers by Devereux and Yetman 
(2001) and Mankiw and Reis (2001) have introduced an alternative framework in which 
prices are predetermined (PP), but a price contract may specify different prices for each 
future period, as in Fischer (1977). This alternative is consistent with the idea that sticky 
prices stem from the cost of drawing up a contract, rather than menu costs.1 In both 
frameworks, firms face a constant, exogenous probability of readjusting their price 
contracts each period, as in Calvo (1983).  
In this existing literature, the probability of setting a new price contract each 
period is exogenous, and common to both the FP and PP models. However, there is no 
intuitive rationale for why this should be the case. In this paper, the probability of 
readjusting price contracts each period is treated as endogenous as in Romer (1990) and 
Devereux and Yetman (2002). We show that the Nash equilibrium frequency of price 
adjustment is less with PP than FP, and the difference between them is increasing in the 
level of real rigidity.  
The next section develops the model.  Section 3 illustrates the results.  A 
conclusion then follows.  
Section 2: A model of sticky prices  
The quantity theory equation is written in log terms as  
(1) , t ty m p= − t
                                                 
1 Mankiw and Ries (2001) refer to these as Sticky Prices and Sticky Information respectively. 
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where  is aggregate output and mty t pt−  represents real balances.  The nominal marginal 
cost facing each firm is  
(2) t tw p ytυ= + , 
where υ  measures the elasticity of the real wage (marginal cost) to output. Therefore the 
desired price of any firm is just the marginal cost in any period (ignoring the constant 
mark-up term), and can be written as 
(3) * (1 )t t tp p mυ υ= − + . 
The lower υ  is, the less willing individual firms are to adjust their desired price, relative 
to the aggregate price level. This is the case where there is real rigidity [Ball and Romer 
(1990), Romer (1996)], or strategic complementarity [Woodford (2001)].   
Consider the pricing decision of a representative firm. A firm that must set its 
price in advance experiences a loss in expected profits, relative to a situation where price 
adjustment is instantaneous, approximately equal to the squared deviation of the log price 
from the desired log price [Walsh (1998)].  Thus any firm i faces an expected loss of      
(4) ! * 2,0 1
1( ) ( ) ( ( ) ) ( ) (j jt t t j t jt j tj jL i F E p i p L i)
κβκ βκ
κ
∞ ∞
+ ++= =
−
= + − +∑ ∑ , 
where β  is the discount factor,  is the cost of updating a price contract,  is the 
probability that the firm does not change its price in any given period, and 
F κ
!
, ( )t j tp i+  is the 
price set by firm  in period  for period ti t j+ .   
Monetary process 
The money stock follows an AR(1) in first differences with drift (empirical 
support for this is provided later). Thus, 
(5) 1 1 2( )t t t tm m m m m uρ− − −− = − + + t , 
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where u 2(0, )t uiid σ∼ . 
Fixed Prices (FP) 
Suppose that changing a nominal price is costly.  Then, when setting a price 
contract at time , a firm will set a fixed nominal price that holds for the life of the 
contract (that is, 
t
! !
, ( ) ( )t j t tp i p i+ = j∀
j
t j
).  The firm sets its price to minimize an expected loss 
of 
(6) , * 2
0
( ) ( ) ( ( ) )jt t t tjL i E p i pβκ
∞
+=
= −∑
or  
(7) *
0
 ( ) (1 ) ( ) jt t jp i Eβκ βκ
∞ p +== − ∑ . 
The aggregate price level for the economy is then given by 
(8) 1(1 )t t tp p pκ κ −= − + . 
Combining (3), (5), (7) and (8) the price level is given by  
(9) 1 1 1(1 ) ( )t t t t t 2p p m m mµ µ α− −= + − + − + mα , 
where 21 (1 ) (1 )1 (1
2
κ υ υ κ υ υµ υ κυ υ κυ 4)
βκ βκ
 − + − +
= − + + − − + + −  
 β
, 
1
(1 )
1
ρβµ µα
ρβµ
−
=
−
, and 
2
2
(1 )
(1 )(1 )(1 )
βκ µα
κ βκ ρβµ υ
−
=
− − −
. 
The equilibrium time-dependent κ  may be approximated numerically.2  
                                                 
2 See the appendix for details.  
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Predetermined Prices (PP) 
Now consider the alternative model where there is a fixed cost to drawing up a 
contract, which may entail a different price for each future period. Beginning the next 
period, the firm will again face a constant probability of adjusting its price contract.   
Clearly the optimal price sequence for firm i is 
(10) *, ( )t j t t t jp i E p+ += , 
while the aggregate price level for the economy is given by 
(11) *
0
(1 ) ( ) jt tj j tp E pκ κ
∞
−=
= − ∑ . 
The price level is the weighted sum of the desired price this period and previous periods 
expectations of this desired price. Using equations (3), (5), (10), and (11), 
(12) 
0
( )t t tj jp m jθ
∞
−=
= −∑ u , 
where 
1 1
1
(1 )( )
(1 ) 1 (1 )(1 )
j j
j
j κ ρθ
ρ κ υ
+ +
+
−
=
 − − − − 
. 
Substituting into (4), the expected loss with PP for firm  who chooses frequency of price 
adjustment  is given by  
l
lκ
(13)   
( )
( )
22 2 1
2 10
1(1 )
1 (1 )(1 )1
j
jCC l u
l l jj
βκ υ σ ρβκ βκ
κ υρ
+
∞
+=
L F
  − = − +   − − −−    
∑ . 
The equilibrium time-dependent κ may then be solved numerically.3,4 
                                                 
3 This loss function contains an infinite sum, where later terms are more heavily discounted. As a result, a 
finite approximation is adequate. For example, the value of lκ that minimizes the first 100 terms is 
identical to the one that minimizes the first 1000 terms to 4 decimal places.  
4 The Nash equilibrium is given by κ lκ κ= , where lκ  minimizes (13). This is determined iteratively, 
resetting  each iteration, until they converge. Note that the Nash equilibrium may be very different 
from the optimal value of (that is, the value if the behavior of other price setters was not taken as 
lκ κ=
κ
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Section 3. A comparison of the FP and PP specifications.  
The optimal contract length may be solved numerically under both FP and PP. 
The monetary process is calibrated to the U. S. economy using non-borrowed reserves, a 
widely used measure of an exogenous policy-determined monetary aggregate. Results 
over the 1959-2000 period are given in Table 1. 
Table 1: Estimated Non-borrowed Reserves 
Dependent variable:  1t tm m −−
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Significance 
Constant 0.0058 0.0027 0.0352 
( ) 1 2t tm m− −− 0.2732 0.0750 0.0004 
2
uσ  0.0012   
 
Note that the constant is statistically significant. m , ρ , and 2uσ  are calibrated to the 
point estimates, and the optimal probability of price adjustment is then solved 
numerically for 0.985β = . The results are given in Figure 1, for different υ  and .
 In all cases, the equilibrium 
F
κ  is less with FP than PP, implying longer average 
contract length in the latter case. This is not surprising, given that with PP, a price setter 
may adjust their prices over the life of a contract, while with FP, they cannot. Note also 
that as the level of real rigidity increases (υ  declines), the difference between the 
equilibrium s increases. κ
                                                                                                                                                 
0.002F = 0.1given). For example, for  and , the Nash equilibrium is , while the 
optimal value is . 0.694lκ =
0.483lκ =υ =
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Section 4. Conclusion 
Elsewhere, papers comparing fixed prices with predetermined prices have 
assumed that the frequency of re-setting price contracts is equal in either case. This note 
demonstrates that in equilibrium, the frequency of re-setting price contracts is greater 
with fixed prices than predetermined prices, for realistic parameter values.  
 
Appendix: Solving for  with Fixed Prices κ
For a given , (3), (5), (8), and (9) are jointly simulated. The optimal price set by 
firm  with price adjustment probability 
κ
l lκ  is  
(A1) ! 1 1 1 2 1 3, (1 ) ( )t t t tt lp p m m m mφ φ φ φ− −= + − + − + , 
where 1
(1 )(1 )
1
l
l
βκ υφ
βκ µ
− −
=
−
µ , [ ]1 1 1 12
(1 )(1 ) (1 )
1
l l
l
βκ υ α βκ φα φ ρ
φ
βκ ρ
− − + + −
=
−
, 
[ ]1 2 1 2
3 2
(1 )
(1 )
1
l
l
βκ φα φ φ
φ υ α
βκ
+ − +
= − +
−
, 
and the realized price in any given period may be computed as  
 (A2) !, ,, , (1 ) ,t l t lt l t l t lp p pφ φ −= + − 1,  
where ,t lφ is a random variable that takes the value 0 with probability lκ  and 1 otherwise. 
Average loss over many possible shocks is given by 
(A3) ( )0
0
2*
, ,,
1
1 L T t tMC
t l t lt l
l t t
L F p
L
β φ−
= =
p = + −  ∑∑ . 
For suitably large (so that initial conditions do not matter), T , and , a grid search 
may be used to determine the value of 
0t L
lκ  that minimizes (A3). The simulation is then 
repeated using the estimated  as the new value oflκ κ , until they converge (to the Nash 
equilibrium). The results presented here are for t0 ,100=  T 200,=  and  1000.L =
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Figure 1: Equilibrium Frequency of Price Adjustment
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